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Whistling in the Wind: Why Federal 
Whistleblower Protections Fall Short of 
their Corporate Governance Goals 
Meera Khan* 
Teetering on the line between hero and villain, whistleblowers 
have a remarkably unusual role in contemporary American 
society. Those who blow the whistle on public sector activities, 
like Edward Snowden and the Watergate Scandal’s “Deep 
Throat”, are often vilified in history as treasonous and 
unprincipled rogues. In the private sector, however, 
whistleblowers are seen as moral compasses for corporate 
behavior, and are even afforded federal protections for speaking 
out against internal malfeasance. The piecemeal evolution of 
whistleblower legislation including the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 
2002 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 created regulatory and enforcement 
failures that ultimately diminish whistleblower protections, and in 
turn, thwart corporate governance. 
While whistleblower protection is generally a bipartisan issue, 
proponents and critics disagree on the level of regulation required 
in order to ensure successful corporate compliance and 
governance. The Wells Fargo cross–selling scandal of 2016 
illustrates that instead of sweeping regulatory changes that the 
government has pushed in the past, current whistleblower 
jurisprudence needs to assess administrative, rather than 
regulatory, reform while engaging in micro–level analyses within 
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companies in order to address the issues that cause the 
whistleblower framework to fail at achieving its corporate 
governance goals. This note examines challenges and criticisms 
regarding the relationship between whistleblowers and effective 
corporate governance and, through Wells Fargo, illustrates the 
growing need for reform in the administration of whistleblower 
protections and procedures.1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Being a whistleblower is an extraordinarily lonely 
existence. You’re putting your livelihood at risk, maybe 
your life, and you can’t tell anyone about it. You have to 
go through every workday as if everything is normal, 
when in fact you’ve made a conscious decision to expose 
illegal actions your company is taking, and you’re doing 
it with the knowledge that the people you work with are 
going to suffer because of that, and some of them may 
even go to jail. It’s incredibly tough.2 
Blow the whistle on a wolf of Wall Street, become a scapegoat. In the 
post–Enron3 collective consciousness, corporate vigilantes who risk their 
jobs to protect the public interest and uphold laws are regarded as unsung 
heroes; yet there remains a persistent ambivalence when it comes to 
utilizing whistleblowers to promote and ensure corporate governance.4 
Developments in federal whistleblower protections, including provisions 
of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 20025 (hereinafter “Sarbanes–Oxley”) and 
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
                                                                                                             
2 HARRY MARKOPOLOS, NO ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE FINANCIAL THRILLER 120 
(John Wiley & Sons, 2010) (Harry Markopolos is a former securities industry executive 
who discovered evidence over nine years suggesting that Bernard Madoff’s wealth 
management business, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, was, in fact, a Ponzi 
scheme. Markopolos alerted the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission of the fraud in 
2000, 2001, and 2005, and supplied supporting documents to no avail. Each time, the SEC 
ignored him or only gave his evidence a cursory investigation. Madoff was finally 
uncovered as a fraud in December 2008, when his sons ousted him to the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation.).  
3 See generally Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of 
Overlapping Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REV. 433 (2009); The Fall of Enron, http://
www.npr.org/news/specials/enron/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2016).  
4 See Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237, 240 (2009).  
5 See generally Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2002).  
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(hereinafter “Dodd–Frank”),6 merely build castles in the air—making 
incremental gains for employees but leaving much to be desired in 
achieving corporate accountability. 
In the wake of the 2016 Wells Fargo cross–selling scandal7 and 
subsequent retaliation class action suits8 filed by former Wells Fargo 
employees, whistleblowers are once again at the forefront of corporate 
governance discourse. This begs the question: is current whistleblower 
jurisprudence effectively achieving its goal of acting as a check on 
financial corporations? The Wells Fargo scandal calls for an opportunity 
to revisit the legislative intent behind prevailing whistleblower protection 
laws and anti–retaliation statutes in order to assess the glaring deficiencies 
in the administration and enforcement of these measures. This comment 
examines the development and evolution of modern whistleblower 
jurisprudence in the corporate context, and the quest for corporate 
governance leading up to the Wells Fargo scandal. Part II of this comment 
summarizes and explains historical, societal, and contemporary 
perspectives on corporate whistleblowing and the evolution of 
whistleblower protections and legislation. Part III considers the role 
corporate governance plays in the current whistleblower framework and 
uses Wells Fargo as a lens to analyze the successes and failures of this 
framework. Part IV suggests practical solutions to facilitate regulatory, 
administrative, and institutional reform in order to encourage and promote 
effective whistleblower protections and corporate governance. Part V 
forecasts the state of whistleblower protections and corporate governance 
following the transition into the Trump administration. Finally, Part VI 
offers concluding thoughts. 
                                                                                                             
6 See generally Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78u–6 (2010).  
7 See generally Aaron Back, Wells Fargo’s Questionable Cross–Selling Strategy, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2016 2:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargos-
questionable-cross-selling-strategy-1473444334/ (Cross–selling is the practice of selling 
an additional product or service to an existing customer. In late 2016, Wells Fargo was 
embroiled in controversy when aggressive sales goals resulting in unethical and illegal 
cross–selling practices were brought to light by whistleblowing former employees.).  
8 See generally Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Workers Claim Retaliation for Playing by 
the Rules, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/09/27/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-workers-claim-retaliation-for-playing-by-the-
rules.html?_r=0/ (A class of current and former Wells Fargo employees sought to file suit 
in the Central District of California for being fired or demoted for refusing to participate in 
illegal cross–selling practices and, thus, falling short of sales goals.).  
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II. THE RISE AND FALL OF FEDERAL WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROTECTIONS 
A. History 
Historically, whistleblowers played a contentious role in society.9 The 
term “whistleblower” itself has its origins in 19th century British practice 
when government, in the form of local unarmed police or “bobbies,” 
would “blow the whistle” to alert citizens and seek help in chasing and 
apprehending pickpockets and shoplifters.10 Whistleblowing has since 
evolved into a sophisticated and complex area of law and regulation. 
Modern–day whistleblowers “serve the public as jurors, witnesses, 
military reservists, and volunteer emergency responders, despite the 
competing demands of their employment.”11 In private sector workplaces, 
whistleblowers are often described as “citizen employees.”12 Citizen 
employees are individuals who blow the metaphoric whistle out of a sense 
of public duty, while potentially risking their jobs, professional relations, 
or their employer’s business.13 Recent examples of citizen employees 
blowing the whistle typically start out with an individual either 
discovering malfeasance on the part of fellow employees or managers, or 
resisting instructions to commit or assist in wrongful activity.14 From 
there, the whistle–yielding individual may report wrongdoing to 
managerial superiors or enforcement authorities.15 
Much of the development in whistleblower protection occurred over 
the last thirty years, but examples of protective employment laws for 
citizen employees date back to the Civil War era.16 Congress enacted the 
1863 False Claims Act to encourage private citizens to sue on behalf of 
the government in order to lay bare the fraudulent practices of companies 
supplying the federal government with deficient goods during the Civil 
War.17 More than a century later, legislation has left whistleblowers with 
                                                                                                             
9 See generally Jisoo Kim, Confessions of A Whistleblower: The Need to Reform the 
Whistleblower Provision of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 249–50 
(2009).  
10 HENRI COLT, SILVIA QUADRELLI & LESTER FRIEDMAN, THE PICTURE OF HEALTH: 
MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE MOVIES 222 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2014); see also ROBERTA A. 
JOHNSON, WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS – AND WHY 4 (Lynne Rienner Publ’g 2002).  
11 Carlson, supra note 4, at 238.  
12 Id. at 237.  
13 Id. at 237–38.  
14 Id. at 238.  
15 Id. 
16 Mary K. Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of 
Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 183, 192 (2007).  
17 Id. at 192; see also False Claims Act 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2000) (The False 
Claims Act (“FCA”) allows a private individual with knowledge of past or present fraud 
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unpredictable protections.18 Narrow exceptions declared by courts and 
legislatures for whistleblowers provide limited reparation against 
employers’ ability to retaliate, and the effectiveness of current anti–
retaliation laws and whistleblower protections remain uncertain.19 For 
example, Wells Fargo clearly demonstrates the futile prophylactic effect 
whistleblower legislation has on both retaliation and corporate 
malfeasance. Regulatory failures that contribute to large–scale corporate 
scandals, however, are due, at least in part, to restrictive coverage and 
interpretation by courts and agencies as well as procedural or 
administrative hurdles that whistleblowers must initially overcome before 
proceeding with seeking redress.20 
Currently, over fifty federal statutes exist to protect whistleblowers.21 
Nearly all states have either statutory or common law whistleblower 
protections, and the parameters of these laws vary considerably depending 
on the jurisdiction.22 However, legal protection and the resulting corporate 
governance remain illusory largely because of the fragmented evolution 
of whistleblower protections in the corporate context.23 The recent move 
toward an enlargement of whistleblower protections and safeguards 
against employer retaliation is credited to the seismic waves of corporate 
scandal that shook the financial world in the last 30 years.24 The 
development of such laws and legislation was a response to several 
influences. In particular, mass fraud resulting from unchecked corporate 
accounting practices on Wall Street played a role in the eventual collapse 
of some of America’s largest corporations in 2001 as well as the financial 
crisis of 2008—ultimately creating the most devastating economic 
recession since the Great Depression.25 “Whistleblower laws reacted not 
only to particular disasters, but also to a lack of confidence in both private 
and public bureaucracies . . . [and] whistleblowers played crucial roles in 
publicizing abuses and regulatory violations.”26 The sheer volume of anti–
retaliation laws that emerged in the last three decades illustrate the 
                                                                                                             
committed against the federal government to bring suit on its behalf. The FCA imposes 
liability on persons, companies, and contractors who defraud governmental programs, and 
it was intended to deal with fraudulent contract claims during the Civil War in which 
contractors provided substandard equipment to the Union Army.).  
18 See Ramirez, supra note 16, at 192–95.  
19 Carlson, supra note 4, at 240.  
20 Id. at 240–42.  
21 Ramirez, supra note 16, at 191.  
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
24 ROBERT G. VAUGHN, THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS 149 
(Edward Elgar Publ’g, Inc., 2012).  
25 Id. at 149–50.  
26 Id. at 150.  
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government’s realization that whistleblowers are a “critical component to 
effective law enforcement in a complex society as insiders [sic] 
furnish[ing] invaluable assistance in the investigation and prosecution of 
public corruption and corporate fraud.”27 Endeavoring to root out 
corporate fraud, Congress passed two key pieces of legislation protecting 
whistleblowers: the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, and the 2010 Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
B. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002: A Response to the Enron Era 
“Enron changed everything.”28 In 2001, the collapse of Enron, one of 
the fastest growing corporations in the US, had devastating effects on the 
lives of thousands of individuals and created a sense of public distrust 
toward large corporations.29 The fall of Enron was followed by the 
discovery of rampant corporate corruption, which contributed to the 
bankruptcy of WorldCom in mid–2002.30 Immediately thereafter, 
Congress passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002,31 which contained 
provisions affording anti–retaliation protections to employees reporting 
violations of federal securities laws at publicly traded corporations.32 
Sarbanes–Oxley was meant “[t]o safeguard investors in public companies 
and restore trust in the financial markets following the collapse of Enron 
Corporation,”33 and, as such, Congress intended for employees, as 
corporate insiders, to be afforded federal anti–retaliation protection in 
order to encourage the disclosure of wrongdoing and ultimately prevent 
future corporate fraud and misconduct.34 Fittingly, TIME magazine 
                                                                                                             
27 Ramirez, supra note 16, at 191.  
28 Chelsea H. Overhuls, Unfinished Business: Dodd–Frank’s Whistleblower Anti–
Retaliation Protections Fall Short for Private Companies and Their Employees, 6 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. ISS. 1, 2–3 (2012).  
29 Id.  
30 Id.; see also Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, Worldcom’s Collapse: The Overview; 
Worldcom Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2002) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/us/worldcom-s-collapse-the-overview-worldcom-
files-for-bankruptcy-largest-us-case.html/. 
31 See generally Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2002).  
32 Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 107–146, at 2–11 (2002) (showing congressional intent for 
Sarbanes–Oxley to create new protections for employees at risk of retaliation for reporting 
corporate misconduct).  
33 Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1161 (2014) (citing S. REP. NO. 107–146, at 
2–11 (2002)).  
34 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2002) (Section 1514A 
prohibits certain companies from discharging or otherwise “discriminat[ing] against an 
employee in the terms and conditions of employment because” the employee “provid[es] 
information . . . or otherwise assist[s] in an investigation regarding any conduct which the 
employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation” of certain criminal fraud statutes, 
64 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:57 
 
declared 2002 the year of the whistleblower and gracing the cover were 
Sherron Watkins (Enron whistleblower), Cynthia Cooper (WorldCom 
whistleblower), and Coleen Rowley of the FBI as persons of the year.35 
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 was a result of political and 
economic forces pressuring the legislature to address corporate corruption 
and eroding financial markets.36 Sarbanes–Oxley also sought to bolster 
corporate accountability by expanding criminal penalties and civil liability 
for fraudsters.37 The idea that “existing corporate culture failed to promote 
honest business practices and discouraged employees from reporting 
dishonest practices”38 was central to Sarbanes–Oxley, and, to address 
these concerns, the Act provided a civil cause of action for whistleblowers 
employed by publicly traded companies.39 In addition to the whistleblower 
provision, Sarbanes–Oxley required that there be channels through which 
employees could report anonymously and directly to the audit committee 
of the board of directors and that corporate officers, including CEOs, sign 
off on financial statements.40 “Congress believed that protecting corporate 
whistleblowers encouraged disclosures crucial to the preservation of the 
interests of shareholders, employees, and consumers.”41 Particularly, the 
Senate drew on the experiences of corporate whistleblowers in drafting the 
whistleblower protection provisions of the law: 
We included meaningful protection for whistleblowers as 
passed by the Senate. We learned from Sherron Watkins 
of Enron that these corporate insiders are the key 
witnesses that need to be encouraged to report fraud and 
help prove it in court . . . there is no way that we could 
have known about [the misconduct of corporate officers] 
without that kind of whistleblower.42 
The whistleblower provision of Sarbanes–Oxley started out as one of 
the most comprehensive private–sector whistleblower laws ever enacted 
                                                                                                             
any SEC rule or regulation, or “any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against 
shareholders.”); see also S. REP. NO. 107–146, at 2–11 (2002).  
35 Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The Whistleblowers, 
TIME (Dec. 30, 2002), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1003967,00
.html/. 
36 Ramirez, supra note 16, at 196–97.  
37 See id. 
38 Id. at 197 (quotations omitted).  
39 Id.  
40 See Stephen M. Kohn, Sarbanes–Oxley Act: Legal Protection for Corporate 
Whistleblowers, NWC NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR, http://www.whistleblowers.org/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27 (last visited Dec. 20, 2016).  
41 VAUGHN, supra note 24, at 152.  
42 Id. (quoting Senator Patrick Leahy regarding Report of the Conference Committee).  
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in the United Stated.43 It provides a cause of action to employees of 
publicly–traded companies who allege that they were retaliated against 
because they provided information about, or participated in an 
investigation relating to, what they reasonably believed constituted mail 
fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, or any violation of 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rules and regulations 
relating to fraud against shareholders.44 
C. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010: A Response to the Financial Crisis of 2008 
Paving the way for whistleblower and retaliation protection in 
subsequent federal statutes, Sarbanes–Oxley heralded a decade of 
congressional enactment of private–sector whistleblower laws, but despite 
its implementation, regulatory failures contributed, in large part, to the 
financial crisis of 2008.45 Following the market collapse of 2008, Congress 
sought to amend and fortify regulation of the financial industry with 
reinvigorated zeal in order to ascertain what bred toxic corporate culture, 
provide the public with a sense of security, and prevent similar disasters 
in the future.46 One of the factors that Congress scrutinized as a facilitator, 
if not the instigator, of the collapse was unchecked corporate behavior and 
lack of governance and compliance metrics.47 Generally, corporate 
governance is “[a] set of principles by which companies are directed and 
controlled”,48 and the parties responsible for ensuring effective and 
adequate corporate governance include a company’s employees, 
managers, directors, shareholders, and the less recognized and often 
ignored whistleblowers.49 
In 2010, Congress rolled out Dodd–Frank as a sweeping regulatory 
solution to the nation’s financial crisis.50 One of the major premises of 
Dodd–Frank’s enactment was “[t]o promote the financial stability of the 
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the 
                                                                                                             
43 Id. at 152.  
44 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2002). 
45 VAUGHN, supra note 24, at 153.  
46 Umang Desai, Crying Foul: Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act of 
2010, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 427, 428 (2012).  
47 Id. (quotations omitted).  
48 Id.  
49 Id. (quotations omitted).  
50 Megan O’Malley, Whistleblower Protections, Retaliation Issues, and Investigative 
Issues Arising Under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Dodd–Frank Act, at 5 (July 31, 
2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/am/2015/omal
ley.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).  
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financial system.”51 As part of its comprehensive program to ensure 
corporate accountability and compliance, Dodd–Frank expanded the 
whistleblower protection provision in Section 806 of Sarbanes–Oxley by: 
extending the statute of limitations, creating an independent right for 
whistleblowers to sue in federal court, and creating measures to ensure that 
protections were non–waivable by employees.52 Dodd–Frank also created 
whistleblower incentive programs with the SEC and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), both of which rewarded 
whistleblowers with a share of any money the government recovered from 
their tip.53 
D. Where are we now: Wells Fargo Slips through the Cracks 
In each of the biggest financial frauds in modern history, employee 
whistleblowers tried to warn others of what was to come, with no avail. 
Sherron Watkins of Enron54 wrote a now infamous letter to then CEO 
Kenneth Lay, warning that “I am incredibly nervous that we will implode 
in a wave of accounting scandals,”55 which had a striking resemblance to 
a former Wells Fargo employee’s letter to CEO John Stumpf from 2007: 
“[l]eft unchecked, the inevitable outcome shall be one of professional and 
reputational damage, consumer fraud and shareholder lawsuits, coupled 
by regulatory sanctions.”56 
                                                                                                             
51 Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd–Frank Whistleblower Program’s 
Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721, 726 (2014) 
(citations omitted).  
52 O’Malley, supra note 50, at 6–10.  
53 S. REP. NO. 111–176, at 110–12 (2010).  
54 See Frank Pellegrini, Person of the Week: Enron Whistleblower Sherron Watkins, 
TIME (Jan. 18, 2002), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,194927,00.html/; 
see also C. William Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Enron, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY (Apr. 
1, 2002), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2002/apr/theriseandfallofenron.
html/ (The Enron scandal, publicized in October 2001, eventually led to the bankruptcy of 
the Enron Corporation, an American energy company based in Houston, Texas, and the de 
facto dissolution of Arthur Andersen, which was one of the five largest audit and 
accountancy partnerships in the world. In addition to being the largest bankruptcy 
reorganization of its time, Enron has been noted as the biggest audit failure in modern 
American history.).  
55 Letter from Sherron Watkins, Vice President of Corp. Dev., Enron Corp., to Kenneth 
Lay, Chief Exec. Officer, Enron Corp. (August 2001) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Justice), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/enron/exhibit/03-15/BBC-0001/Images/9811.001.PDF/. 
56 Matt Egan, Letter Warned Wells Fargo of ‘Widespread’ Fraud in 2007 – Exclusive, 
CNN MONEY (Oct. 18, 2016, 11:23 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/18/investing/
wells-fargo-warned-fake-accounts-2007/index.html?iid=hp-stack-dom/ (Former Wells 
Fargo CEO John Stumpf testified under oath that he was never notified of illicit cross–
selling issues until 2013. Soon thereafter, however, a 2007 letter addressed to Stumpf 
surfaced, in which a Wells Fargo employee warned of widespread wrongful sales practices 
and “routine deception and fraudulent exploitation of our clients.”).  
2018] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 67 
 
In 2013, the Economist named banking institution Wells Fargo “[t]he 
big winner from the financial crisis[,]” owing its success to a “prosaic” 
practice of serving customers.57 While these customers were still in the 
dark about the truth behind Wells Fargo’s sales practices, rumblings of 
fraud and malfeasance were sounding amongst employees and falling on 
deaf ears. Until recently. A mere three years later, Wells Fargo’s narrative 
quickly shifted from its rise to stardom to its fall from grace. The financial 
crisis’ big winner is now a “school for scoundrels,”58 where the prosaic 
practice of serving customers was just a thinly veiled attempt to hide 
insatiable corporate greed. 
Wells Fargo built its reputation eschewing complex financial 
instruments and Wall Street, and focusing instead on individual savings 
and checking accounts as well as loans for ordinary consumers.59 The bank 
owed its growth and success to fostering relationships with customers 
through “cross–selling” new accounts—the same practice that left Wells 
Fargo fraught with scandal.60 CEO John Stumpf’s mantra was “eight is 
great,” which set a target for employees to get eight Wells Fargo products 
into the hands of each customer—whether it be savings and checking 
accounts, credit cards, mortgages, or car loans.61 As the sales directives 
became too demanding to satisfy, employees began to find a different way 
to meet the bottom line—eventually more than 2 million accounts were 
opened by Wells Fargo employees without customers’ consent or 
knowledge, most of which were not discovered by customers until after 
news of the scandal broke.62 Those who complained of sales goals or 
fraudulent cross–selling tactics were often fired for failing to meet the 
target.63 In the wake of the scandal at least 5,300 Wells Fargo employees 
were fired for ethics violations that included setting up illicit accounts 
without customers’ knowledge in order to meet sales objectives.64 The 
biggest losers, however ended up being the whistleblowers: employees 
who were fired or demoted for playing by the rules, staying honest, and 
                                                                                                             
57 Wells Fargo: Riding High, ECONOMIST (Sept. 14, 2013), http://www.economist.com/
news/finance-and-economics/21586295-big-winner-financial-crisis-riding-high/. 
58 Jana Kasperkevic, ‘School for Scoundrels’: Wells Fargo cuts not Enough for 
Outraged US Congress, Guardian (Sept. 29, 2016, 2:07 PM) https://www.theguardian.
com/business/2016/sep/29/wells-fargo-clawbacks-outraged-us-congress/. 
59 See Wells Fargo: Riding High, supra note 57.  
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Mike Mullen, Wells Fargo’s employees tried to warn us about their executives, CITY 
PAGES (Nov. 2, 2016), http://www.citypages.com/news/wells-fargos-employees-tried-to-
warn-us-about-their-executives/399523211.  
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
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falling short of unachievable sales goals.65 The big winner of the financial 
crisis turned out to be another Wall Street wolf scapegoating its citizen 
employees. 
III. FITTING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INTO THE CURRENT 
WHISTLEBLOWER FRAMEWORK 
I turned over everything I knew to the SEC. Five times I 
reported my concerns, and no one would listen until it was 
far too late . . . .66 I don’t know how I could have been 
more explicit. I gave them a roadmap and a flashlight . . . 
[but] they didn’t go where I told them to go.67 
While Harry Markopolos was not a Madoff Investment Securities 
employee, he uncovered and blew the whistle on Madoff’s $65 billion 
dollar Ponzi scheme on several occasions.68 The SEC’s reluctance to 
consider evidence and documentation of fraud that was brought forth by a 
quantitative financial specialist highlighted the fact that whistleblowers 
and corporate fraud were not being taken seriously. Hence, while the 
framework for whistleblowers to report corporate malfeasance is arguably 
in place, administrative and legal hurdles often make whistleblower 
retaliation a uniquely difficult issue to resolve. 
A. Statutory Interpretation: Internal v. External Reporting 
One of Dodd–Frank’s most significant expansions of Sarbanes–
Oxley’s whistleblowing provisions was in allowing employees to proceed 
directly to court to sue if their employers retaliated against them for 
reporting corporate misconduct.69 While both Acts shield whistleblowers 
from retaliation, they differ in important respects. Sarbanes–Oxley applies 
to all “employees” who report misconduct to the SEC, any other federal 
agency, Congress, or an internal supervisor;70 Dodd–Frank, on the other 
hand, defines a “whistleblower” as “any individual who provides . . . 
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the 
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the 
                                                                                                             
65 Cowley, supra note 8.  
66 MARKOPOLOS, supra note 2, at 3.  
67 Frontline: The Madoff Affair, Interview with Harry Markopolos (PBS television 
broadcast May 12, 2009).  
68 Id.  
69 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6 
(2010).  
70 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2002).  
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Commission.”71 A whistleblower so defined is eligible for an award if 
original information provided to the SEC leads to a successful 
enforcement action.72 Additionally, the SEC’s regulations implementing 
Dodd–Frank provisions contain two discrete whistleblower definitions: 
for purposes of the award program, Rule 21F–2 requires a whistleblower 
to “provide the Commission with information” relating to possible 
securities–law violations.73 For purposes of the anti–retaliation 
protections, however, the Rule does not require SEC reporting.74 
As such, courts were reluctant to reach a consensus on whether or not 
Dodd–Frank necessarily mandated reporting misconduct to the SEC in 
order to proceed with a whistleblower claim. Ultimately, conflicting views 
of the SEC rule as it pertains to Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower protections 
resulted in a circuit split, which was recently resolved by the Supreme 
Court in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers.75 The fractured interpretation 
of internal versus external reporting leading up to Digital Realty began in 
2013 with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), 
LLC.76 
1. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC 
In Asadi, the Fifth Circuit scaled back protections guaranteed to those 
who internally reported violation of securities laws directly to their 
employers, rather than to the SEC.77 Breaking away from the prevailing 
jurisprudence interpreting the scope of the Dodd–Frank anti–retaliation 
protections to extend to internal whistleblowers, Asadi held that 
employees who made internal reports within their company, rather than 
directly to the SEC, were not covered under Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower 
protections.78 
                                                                                                             
71 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(a)(6).  
72 Id. at § 78u–6(b)–(g).  
73 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–2(a)(1).  
74 See § 240.21F–2(b)(1)(i)–(ii).  
75 See 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).  
76 See 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).  
77 Id. at 625.  
78 Id. (Khaled Asadi filed a complaint alleging that his employer, G.E. Energy, violated 
Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower protection provision by terminating him after he made an 
internal report of a possible securities law violation. The U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas granted GE Energy’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Asadi was not a “whistleblower” under 
Dodd–Frank because the plain language of the Dodd–Frank whistleblower protection 
provision creates a private cause of action only for individuals who provide information to 
the SEC.).  
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The Asadi decision discussed two conflicting provisions of Dodd–
Frank that led to subsequent conflicting interpretations of its protections.79 
Subsection (h) of Section 78u–6 of Dodd–Frank provides protections from 
retaliation to whistleblowers who “provid[e] information to the SEC” and 
“initiat[e], testif[y] in, or assis[t] any investigation or judicial or 
administrative action” of the SEC based on this information; or (iii) “in 
making disclosures that are required or protected” under specified federal 
laws, including those under the SEC’s jurisdiction.80 Ultimately, Asadi 
held that the text of Dodd–Frank does not address internal reporting at 
all.81 Instead, it only addressed SEC reporting procedures under Sarbanes–
Oxley.82 
2. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy 
Following Asadi, the Second Circuit created a circuit split via Berman 
v. Neo@Ogilvy by holding that an employee fired after reporting securities 
violations internally to his employer could seek remedies under Dodd–
Frank.83 The court in Berman ultimately did not resolve the tension 
between the definitional section of subsection 21F(a)(6) and subdivision 
(iii) of subsection 21(F)(h)(1)(A), but rather held that it created sufficient 
ambiguity as to the coverage of subdivision (iii) to oblige the court to give 
Chevron deference to the SEC’s rule.84 
                                                                                                             
79 Id. at 623.  
80 Asadi, 720 F.3d at 624.  
81 Id. at 625.  
82 Id.  
83 See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015) (Daniel Berman 
worked as finance director at media agency Neo@Oglivy. During the course of his 
employment, Berman discovered fraudulent accounting practices, and reported them 
internally. Berman was later terminated in April of 2013. In October of 2013, Berman 
reported the suspected fraudulent practices to the SEC and, under the purview of Dodd–
Frank, pursued a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit against his former employer. The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment 
dismissing Berman’s claims, holding that, in light of the “whistleblower” definition in 
Dodd–Frank, only those discharged from employment for reporting alleged violations to 
the SEC were protected. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that 
Berman may pursue retaliation remedies under Dodd Frank Section 21F, despite having 
reported the wrongdoing only internally, but not to the SEC, before his termination.).  
84 Id. at 148 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984)) (The Chevron Doctrine refers to judicial deference 
given to administrative actions. In Chevron, the Supreme Court set forth a legal test as to 
when the court should defer to the agency’s answer or interpretation, holding that such 
judicial deference is appropriate where the agency’s answer was not unreasonable, so long 
as Congress had not spoken directly to the precise issue at question. According to Chevron, 
when a legislative delegation to an administrative agency on a particular issue or question 
is implicit rather than explicit, a court may not substitute its own interpretation of the statute 
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrative agency.).  
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3. Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers 
Faced with fractured case law and inconsistent outcomes from two 
Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this 
conflict in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers.85 In Digital Realty, the 
Supreme Court narrowed the definition of “whistleblower” under Dodd–
Frank and ruled that whistleblowers are only protected against retaliation 
from employers under Dodd–Frank if they report allegations of an 
employer’s securities law violations to the SEC.86 As a result of Digital 
Realty, whistleblowers who report alleged violations through an 
employer’s internal compliance program without also reporting to the SEC 
will no longer be able to avail themselves of Dodd–Frank’s protections 
against retaliation. 
B. Administration: Enforcement and Reporting Procedures 
Whistleblower laws arise from and are applied in different contexts, 
making it difficult to easily characterize and dissect these laws.87 Because 
enforcement of whistleblower laws is not left exclusively to courts, 
administrative bodies are crucial in enforcing whistleblower protections; 
the investigation of corporate misconduct disclosures and employer 
retaliation allegations are largely left to administrative agencies.88 
However, institutional failures, particularly within the financial world, 
highlight weaknesses within the administrative agencies that are charged 
with enforcing whistleblower laws. 
1. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) 
Although the SEC is the ultimate regulator of the securities industry, 
organizations like The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
                                                                                                             
85 See 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).  
86 Id. at 776. (Paul Somers served as Vice President of real estate investment trust, 
Digital Realty Trust, Inc., from 2010 to 2014. Somers was allegedly terminated by Digital 
Realty shortly after he reported suspected securities violations to senior management. 
Somers did not alert the SEC of his termination, nor did he file an administrative complaint 
within 180 days of his termination, rendering him ineligible for relief under Sarbanes–
Oxley. Somers brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California alleging a whistleblower retaliation claim under Dodd–Frank. Digital Realty 
moved to dismiss that claim, arguing that “Somers does not qualify as a ‘whistleblower’ 
under [§ 78u–6(h)] because he did not report any alleged law violations to the SEC.” 119 
F.Supp.3d, at 1094. The District Court denied the motion, holding that Rule 21F–2 did not 
necessitate recourse to the SEC prior to gaining “whistleblower” status under Dodd–Frank. 
Finding the statutory scheme ambiguous, the court accorded deference to the SEC’s Rule 
under the Chevron doctrine.).  
87 VAUGHN, supra note 24, at 1.  
88 Id. at 2.  
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(“FINRA”) act as non–governmental private regulators of member 
brokerage firms and exchange markets.89 Termination of employees 
within member firms must be reported to FINRA, requiring that “when a 
registered representative leaves a firm for any reason, the firm must file a 
form U5, which is the Uniform Termination Notice for Securities Industry 
Registration for self–regulatory organizations (SROs) including FINRA 
and states/jurisdictions.”90 The Form U5 must be submitted within 30 days 
of the registered representative leaving the firm and generally is required 
to be filed electronically. Firms are also required to provide the registered 
representative with a copy of their Form U5 within 30 days.91 
The U5 is a form in the banking industry that essentially acts as a 
permanent report card from all former employers. Several former 
employees alleged that Wells Fargo used its U5 reporting power to 
retaliate against those who tried to blow the whistle on the bank’s 
fraudulent activities.92 Through U5’s, the bank essentially branded 
whistleblowing employees with a scarlet letter, potentially damaging 
future career prospects.93 To investigate these claims, three Democratic 
senators asked FINRA for data on Wells Fargo’s U5 filings. The responses 
they received “paint[ed] a disturbing picture,” and the U5 forms 
“confirm[ed] that Wells Fargo had ample information about the scope of 
fraudulent sales practices” long before it reached settlements with the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.94 As a result of these revelations, 
FINRA launched an extensive sweep of broker–dealer cross–selling.95 
2. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) 
The breakdown in whistleblowing reporting and regulation procedures 
does not stop at FINRA. Because Dodd–Frank extends its whistleblower 
protections to workers who report violations of financial consumer 
protection laws to their employer, the bureau, or any other federal, state or 
                                                                                                             
89 About FINRA, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about (last visited Jan. 2, 2017).  
90 Terminate an Individual’s Registration, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/
terminate-individuals-registration (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).  
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Episode 732: Bad Form, Wells Fargo, NPR (Oct. 28, 2016 10:19 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2016/10/28/499805238/episode-732-bad-form-wells-
fargo (transcript of podcast episode discussing Wells Fargo scandal).  
94 Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Faces Scrutiny for Black Marks on Ex–Employee Files, 
NY TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/04/business/
dealbook/wells-fargo-faces-scrutiny-for-black-marks-on-ex-employee-files.html?_r=0.  
95 Finra in Cross–Sell Crackdown, BARRON’S (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.barrons.com/
articles/finra-in-cross-sell-crackdown-1477654006.  
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local authority,96 the law provides procedures for a covered employee to 
file a retaliation complaint with the secretary of labor, and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (hereinafter “OSHA”) is 
responsible for processing those complaints.97 In March of 2016, OSHA 
laid out the final rules and procedures for employees making 
whistleblower retaliation claims under Dodd–Frank.98 The final rule 
established conclusive procedures and time frames for the handling of 
retaliation complaints under the CFPA, including procedures and time 
frames for employee complaints to OSHA.99 
Among the bevy of Wells Fargo whistleblowers that emerged after the 
scandal, one prominent case was that of former Wells Fargo general 
manager Claudia Ponce de Leon; Ponce de Leon was among at least four 
other former Wells Fargo employees who filed whistleblower retaliation 
complaints in December 2011 with OSHA, alleging termination for telling 
superiors about employees opening unauthorized accounts.100 Nearly five 
years later, Ponce de Leon still has not been interviewed by OSHA 
investigators.101 According to OSHA records, Ponce de Leon’s retaliation 
complaint against Wells Fargo for reporting potential misconduct was one 
of several dozens filed against the bank over the last 14 years.102 
Government regulators are still not meeting targets set by law—a problem 
that was also flagged in a critical internal report issued in September 
2015.103 OSHA had yet to close out 34 of the 91 complaints it has received 
since fiscal year 2002 from Wells Fargo employees alleging they faced 
retaliation after reporting potential wrongdoing.104 “It’s absolutely 
outrageous that whistleblowers contacted OSHA as early as 2009 about 
                                                                                                             
96 Aaron Vehling, OSHA Sets Rules For Dodd–Frank Whistleblowers, LAW360 (Mar. 
16, 2016, 8:06 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/772351/osha-sets-rules-for-dodd-
frank-whistleblowers.  
97 Id. 
98 29 C.F.R. § 1985 (2016).  
99 Id.  
100 Sarah N. Lynch, Wells Fargo complaints show flaws in federal whistleblower 
program, REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2016 6:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wells-
fargo-accounts-whistleblower-idUSKCN12D2M0/. 
101 Wells Fargo Employees Have a History of Suing the Bank, FORTUNE (Sept. 29, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/09/29/wells-fargo-employees-sue/; see also Liz Wagner & Mark 
Villarreal, Former Federal Investigator Says Government Didn’t Investigate Wells Fargo 
Whistleblower Cases, NBC BAY AREA, http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Former-
Federal-Investigator-Says-Government-Didnt-Investigate-Wells-Fargo-Whistleblower-
Cases-397518261.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2017).  
102 Wells Fargo Employees Have a History of Suing the Bank, FORTUNE (Sept. 29, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/09/29/wells-fargo-employees-sue/. 
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
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potential fraud at Wells Fargo, and yet these government bureaucrats 
failed to do their job.”105 
a. Overburdened and Under–resourced 
Federal OSHA is a small agency.106 In conjunction with state partners, 
OSHA currently employs approximately 2,100 inspectors responsible for 
the health and safety of 130 million workers, employed at more than 8 
million worksites around the nation—which translates to about one 
compliance officer for every 59,000 workers.107 OSHA has 10 regional 
offices and 90 local area offices and a budget of $552,787,000 for the 2016 
fiscal year.108 
Based on these scarce numbers alone, OSHA has been continuously 
challenged in its ability to conduct investigations in a timely manner.109 In 
2009, U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) examined the 
processing times for whistleblower claims and challenges OSHA faced in 
administering the program.110 At that time, the GAO found that OSHA 
faced two key challenges—it lacked standardized procedures for 
adequately ensuring the quality and consistency of investigations.111 
Additionally, investigators reported a lack of resources, such as the 
requisite training, legal assistance, and equipment that is necessary to do 
their jobs.112 The GAO made recommendations intended to improve the 
Whistleblower Protection Program and enhance oversight and the 
Department of Labor pledged to take action and address most of the 
recommendations, however results and improvement remain to be seen 
nearly a decade later.113 
b. Success Rates 
University of Nebraska–Lincoln’s Professor Richard E. Moberly 
conducted numerous empirical studies on corporate whistleblowing, all of 
which indicated that there is overall a low success rate in whistle blower 
                                                                                                             
105 Id. 
106 Commonly Used Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, O.S.H.A., https://www.osha.gov/
oshstats/commonstats.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2017).  
107 Id.  
108 Id.  
109 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO–09–106, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 
PROGRAM: BETTER DATA AND IMPROVED OVERSIGHT WOULD HELP ENSURE PROGRAM 
QUALITY AND CONSISTENCY 1, 18–19 (2009).  
110 Id. at 4.  
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 32–33.  
113 Id.  
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claims filed with OSHA under Sarbanes–Oxley.114 The study showed that 
during the first three years of Sarbanes–Oxley’s implementation, there was 
only a 3.6% success rate for whistleblower claims during the initial 
administrative process and only a 6.5% success rate for appeals.115 The 
study pointed to “administrative recalcitrance and adjudicative 
hamstringing” as the main causes of such low success rates for 
whistleblowers, and included “improper application by OSHA of SOX’s 
favorable burden of proof to the claimant’s detriment, lack of increased 
OSHA personnel to handle the massive influx of retaliation cases post–
SOX, OSHA’s lack of expertise to investigate complex financial fraud 
cases, and rulings by administrative law judges that narrowly interpret 
SOX’s protections” as a non–exhaustive list of reasons for such dismal 
results.116 These data–based findings assist in identifying the provisions 
and procedures of the Act that do not work as Congress intended and 
suggest potential remedies for these statutory and administrative 
deficiencies. 
c. Litigation: Jumping through Hoops 
i. Arbitrating Entangled Claims 
Section 922 of Dodd–Frank contains key provisions exempting 
whistleblower claims from mandatory arbitration due to the reality of 
employers seeking to avoid civil suit in federal court under Sarbanes–
Oxley by mandating arbitration agreements in employment contracts.117 
However, as part of its overall goal to protect whistleblowers and 
encourage corporate governance, Section 922(c) of Dodd–Frank 
invalidates any “agreement, policy form, or condition of employment, 
including a pre–dispute arbitration agreement” that has the effect of 
waiving rights and remedies available to Sarbanes–Oxley 
whistleblowers.118 
                                                                                                             
114 See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why 
Sarbanes–Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 67, 91–95 
(2007) (Professor Moberly conducted an empirical study of all Department of Labor 
Sarbanes–Oxley determinations during the first three years of the Act’s implementation. 
The results consisted of over 700 separate decisions from administrative investigations and 
hearings, of which a detailed analysis demonstrated that administrative decision makers 
strictly construed, and in some cases misapplied, Sarbanes–Oxley’s substantive protections 
to the significant disadvantage of employees.).  
115 Id. at 67.  
116 See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes–Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 
64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 29 (2012).  
117 O’Malley, supra note 50.  
118 Id. at 7.  
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Dodd–Frank’s ban on pre–dispute arbitration agreements opens the 
door to other questions regarding entangled claims that can be brought 
under either Sarbanes–Oxley or Dodd–Frank. Some courts have held that 
where a common nucleus of operative facts exists between a claim brought 
under Sarbanes–Oxley and another claim, then Sarbanes–Oxley, as 
amended by Dodd–Frank, bars arbitration of either claims however Courts 
have not reached a consensus on the matter.119 The question of whether 
these claims are arbitrable is significant because of the disagreement 
among federal courts on whether Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank claims 
and protections overlap for employees who only report securities 
violations internally. 
ii. Establishing a Prima Facie Retaliation Case and the 
Trouble with Burden–Shifting 
Should a whistleblower choose to directly take his or her claim to 
court, her or she must then overcome significant hurdles in order to 
establish a prima facie retaliation claim. The burden–shifting mechanism 
applied in employment discrimination and retaliation claims poses a near–
impossible challenge to plaintiffs when alleging the elements of such 
claims.120 In addition to the administrative issues involving whistleblower 
protections, there remains an inherent Catch–22 with establishing a prima 
facie retaliation claim under Dodd–Frank. Employees need to demonstrate 
that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action. 
The employer, however, can defend by demonstrating through clear and 
convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action absent the 
protected activity. 
Burden–shifting mechanisms are particularly troublesome for 
corporate governance because they act as a way for employers to insulate 
themselves and avoid liability. To remedy this—there should be an 
allowance for a de facto finding of the “contributing factor” element in 
cases involving companies that are under investigation for fraudulent or 
unethical business practices. Alternatively, involvement in a pending 
investigation related to the employees’ whistleblowing claim could bar 
employers from showing that the employee would have been fired 
regardless. While Dodd–Frank also provides a private right of action for 
employees who have suffered retaliation, problems establishing a prima 
                                                                                                             
119 Id.; see also Laubenstein v. Conair Corp., No. 5:14–CV–05227, 2014 WL 6609164, 
at *3 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 19, 2014).  
120 O’Malley, supra note 50.  
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facie claim get in the way of withstanding dismissal and hinder achieving 
effective corporate governance and compliance.121 
d. Compensation: Incentivizing Corporate Governance 
for the Citizen Employee 
The Dodd–Frank Act also creates numerous incentives for 
whistleblowing, including a bounty paid to eligible whistleblowers who 
voluntarily provide the SEC with original information leading to a 
successful enforcement action in which the SEC recovers monetary 
sanctions in an amount of $1 million.122 Section 922 of the Dodd–Frank 
Act provides “powerful” monetary incentives for whistleblowers to report 
securities law violations to the SEC. Pursuant to section 21F, 
“whistleblowers” who “voluntarily” provide the Commission with 
“original” information about violations of securities laws shall be awarded 
a share of between 10% and 30% of monetary sanctions ultimately 
imposed by the Commission where the sanctions exceed $1 million.123 
However, the Wells Fargo scandals illustrate the futility of this provision 
in certain scenarios. 
Critics argue that the bounty program is fundamentally flawed because 
it attempts to “combat corporate opportunism by encouraging employee 
opportunism.”124 Because the SEC does not require corporate 
whistleblowers to report violations internally to their employer first to be 
eligible for a bounty, critics argue that the financial incentives discourage 
internal reporting.125 However, in reality, mandating internal 
whistleblowing would likely dissuade whistleblowers from coming 
forward altogether. The SEC’s approach credits “incentivizing–rather than 
requiring–internal reporting” as more likely to promote compliance by 
corporations. 126 
The Dodd–Frank Act’s additional whistleblower retaliation 
protections, though sound in theory, are ultimately unworkable in practice. 
In most modern fraud cases, the involvement and pleas of whistleblowers 
are typically brought to light ex post. High–profile corporate frauds all 
seem to follow a similar pattern. Misconduct is discovered first, followed 
by the long–ignored warnings of whistleblowers. This directly undermines 
the whistleblowing protection afforded by Dodd–Frank Act and its 
                                                                                                             
121 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6 
(2010).  
122 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6.  
123 Id.  
124 Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the 
New Era of Dodd–Frank Act “Bounty Hunting”, 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 483 (2012).  
125 Id. at 508–09.  
126 Id. at 502.  
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purpose in encouraging compliance and corporate governance. The 
whistleblower provision was meant to facilitate a more ex ante approach 
to governance, where whistleblowers are given an avenue that they can 
utilize in order to be heard and prevent companies’ fraudulent or unethical 
practices from reaching the point that Wells Fargo has. While 
whistleblowers act as a corporate moral compass and are essential in 
revealing and preventing corporate fraud and understanding the truth 
behind sophisticated corporate and securities fraud,127 offering bounty 
incentives to those who risk their careers to improve toxic corporate 
practices will ultimately be rendered useless in facilitating corporate 
governance until the ambiguity is reporting and administrative procedures 
is addressed and improved. 
IV. HOW TO FIX IT 
The challenges in encouraging whistleblowers illustrate the pervasive 
issue of regulatory capture as it relates to the financial industry.128 Reports 
over the last decade present a mixed perspective as to the effectiveness of 
federal regulation regarding the protection of whistleblowers.129 In 2003, 
the National Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety and Health 
(hereinafter “NACOSH”) charged that OSHA had a “dismal record” of 
protecting whistleblowers and pointed to the declining number of 
complaints being filed with the agency as evidence that workers’ 
confidence in OSHA’s ability to protect them was waning.130 Other 
concerns voiced included the increased responsibility that Congress was 
giving to OSHA to enforce whistleblower protection in areas beyond 
safety and health, starting with Sarbanes–Oxley in 2003 and additionally, 
Dodd–Frank in 2010.131 
OSHA currently only employs 88 investigators working out of 10 
regional offices to handle whistleblower claims nationwide—OSHA is a 
small agency given the size of its mission.132 There is a need for expansion, 
with more personnel handling retaliation claims. Additionally, OSHA 
should liaise with agencies such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Federal Trade 
Commission, and National Labor Relations Board in reviewing Dodd–
                                                                                                             
127 Overhuls, supra note 28, at 4.  
128 Timothy P. Glynn, Taking Self–Regulation Seriously: High–Ranking Officer 
Sanctions for Work–Law Violations, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 279, 287 (2012).  
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Frank and Sarbanes–Oxley related claims. Alternatively, compliance and 
auditing investigations could be outsourced to neutral third–party 
companies as well. 
The GAO’s 2009 report suggested that better data and improved 
oversight would help ensure quality and consistency of whistleblower 
protection programs.133 Based on the GAO’s findings, the Department of 
Labor lacked reliable information on processing times and, as a result, 
could not accurately report how long it took to investigate and close a case 
or decide on certain appeals.134 OSHA does not have an effective 
mechanism to ensure that the data are accurately recorded in its database, 
and GAO’s file reviews revealed that the key dates are often inaccurately 
recorded in the database or cannot be verified due to a lack of supporting 
documentation.135 At the appeals level, the reliability of information on the 
processing times is mixed.136 At all levels of the whistleblower program, 
GAO found that increasing caseloads, case complexity, and 
accommodating requests from the parties’ legal counsel affect case 
processing times.137  While OSHA administers whistleblower statutes, its 
main area of expertise is on general labor and employment matters. 
Securities fraud, being a complex area of law, requires a sophisticated 
understanding of financial and accounting practices that OSHA 
investigators generally do not have. OSHA would function most 
effectively at administering whistleblower laws and helping achieve 
corporate governance if it provided the requisite training, background, or 
experience to its investigators in order to assess these claims. Additionally, 
expanding OSHA’s limited scope of authority to include the power to 
subpoena companies to submit documents or order witnesses to testify 
would create a greater compliance culture within companies.138 
In 2009, the GAO found that many of OSHA’s shortcomings could be 
attributed to that fact that it did not “routinely conduct independent audits 
of the program to ensure consistent application of its policies and 
procedures.”139 Although OSHA developed a field audit program to 
remedy this, the GAO found several deficiencies in the program.140 For 
example, the auditing process did not operate independently, which is an 
important aspect in ensuring fair and effective auditing.141 In 2010, the 
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GAO followed up with another report on OSHA’s Whistleblower 
Protection Program, finding that sustained management attention was 
needed to address long–standing program weaknesses.142 
Evidently, OSHA has struggled with ongoing scrutiny of its ability to 
handle the responsibilities conferred to it through Sarbanes–Oxley and 
Dodd–Frank. The lack of an efficient administrative apparatus in place for 
handling whistleblower claims largely contributes to the breakdown and 
inability to ensure proper protection that would meaningfully contribute to 
corporate governance. If, for instance, OSHA was better–equipped to 
handle the administration of the Whistleblower Protection Program, 
employees may feel more empowered to make reports knowing that they 
will be taken seriously and their claims would be handled expediently. 
However, the lack of resources and lengthy processing times often lead to 
individuals, including many who were connected with Wells Fargo, to feel 
discouraged and often withdraw their claims altogether. This ultimately 
does little to help with corporate governance in situations like the Wells 
Fargo debacle because these complaints are ignored, often for years, and 
by the time they are given any attention the instances of fraud and 
malfeasance being complained about may already be public knowledge. 
A. Collaboration 
Most recently, in 2014 the GAO released its latest report on OSHA’s 
Whistleblower Protection Program, suggesting that opportunities exist for 
OSHA and the Department of Transportation, in particular, to strengthen 
collaborative mechanisms.143 While this report was specifically aimed at 
the automotive industry and transportation workers, many of the 
deficiencies can also be seen and improved upon in the financial industry 
as well. The GAO generally works to encourage the idea of collaboration 
between agencies. The 2014 report in fact stated “[i]n our past work, we 
concluded that collaboration is critical when meaningful results that the 
federal government seeks to achieve require the coordinated efforts of 
more than one federal agency.”144 However, OSHA’s role with respect to 
whistleblowing in the financial context is particularly unique from other 
contexts and makes interagency collaboration more complex. In the 
financial context, OSHA focuses on the retaliation issue rather than the 
evaluation of whistleblower disclosures, which is passed off to the SEC 
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and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).145 Therefore, 
OSHA is not entirely at fault for the administrative allocation of handling 
whistleblower cases. 
Obviously, former–Wells Fargo employees and whistleblowers who 
speak out in general are concerned with employer retaliation and having 
adequate procedures in place to deal with retaliation would make people 
more willing to come forward. However, before delving into the role 
retaliation plays in whistleblower protections, it makes sense to first make 
OSHA more efficient in dealing with these complaints thereby improve 
regulatory compliance more generally. Interagency collaboration may 
create more accountability and various outlets for aggrieved 
whistleblowers to seek. For example, a cursory glance at the OSHA 
Whistleblower Investigations Manual shows that there are clearly 
technical issues as to whether the whistleblower’s original complaint 
related to violations of the relevant statutes, which is a matter about which 
the SEC would have technical expertise that OSHA might not have, 
therefore warranting the argument for interagency collaboration.146 
B. Compensation 
The Wells Fargo context, in particular, illustrates an all–too–common 
situation in which Dodd–Frank’s bounty provision fails to encourage good 
business practices and effective corporate governance.147 This incentive is 
rendered completely irrelevant in many cases because the whistleblowers’ 
claims are ignored or mishandled by OSHA at the very outset, foreclosing 
the possibility of ever receiving bounty payment.148 Additionally, the 
ambiguity surrounding internal and external reporting in order to receive 
Dodd–Frank protections creates another hurdle for employees to 
overcome before having the bounty option available to them, thus 
discouraging reporting and further hindering corporate oversight. 
Settlements in particular are also often a problematic variable in the 
context of whistleblowing and corporate governance. The utilization of 
whistleblowers to facilitate corporate governance relies heavily on the fact 
that the revelation of corporate malfeasance will act as a deterrent and help 
encourage a culture of compliance within companies. However, because 
settlements are often not made public and decided out of court, companies 
often benefit from quietly settling and not having whistleblower 
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allegations publicized, as was the case with numerous Wells Fargo 
whistleblowers leading up to 2016.149 
C. Corporate Culture and Internal Policy Implementation 
Clearly, there is also a need for top–down reform in practices dealing 
with corporate compliance strategies. Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf’s 
congressional hearing proved that Congress’ attempt at facilitating such 
reform through Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank failed when Stumpf 
pleaded ignorance as to what was going on and blamed low–level 
employees for the company’s transgressions.150 Corporate culture starts at 
the top and a development of a code of conduct or ethics and its 
implementation by a board would raise institutional and investor 
awareness. Similar to the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct 
Authority,151 Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank need an ancillary 
enforcement organization that will ensure guidance for employees on both 
senior and lower levels regarding their “duties of responsibility.” This 
organization or committee should independently conduct compliance 
audits of both corporations and administrative bodies like OSHA 
supplemented by supervisory reviews on multiple levels for large financial 
corporations. Additionally, employees need to be fully aware of different 
avenues of relief and protection they have in the workplace. This includes 
having a detailed training on the reporting procedures under Sarbanes–
Oxley and Dodd–Frank, as well as of respective company conduct and 
ethics policies in order to further build transparency and trust. 
Working at large institutions dilutes transparency and trust, especially 
when employees are unaware of what is happening at the top. Appointing 
strong compliance officers at all levels will give employees a stronger 
sense of transparency, trust, and oversight. This also works hand–in–hand 
with the idea of collaboration, which calls for more cooperation between 
companies like Wells Fargo and agencies like OSHA and the SEC. More 
OSHA or regulatory personnel interacting with and being available to 
employees would create a better sense of comfort amongst those who are 
considering whistleblowing, while also simultaneously creating a safer 
company culture. 
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V. A FORECAST ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 
The dismantling of Dodd–Frank has been highly anticipated since the 
election of President Trump.152 Earlier this year, for instance, Senate 
passed a bipartisan measure to remove dozens of banks from under the 
purview of Dodd–Frank.153 Many view the Financial CHOICE Act, a bill 
sponsored by Congressman Jeb Hensarling, as a possible successor to 
Dodd–Frank.154 The Financial CHOICE Act in its current form, however, 
does not alter either the whistleblower reward programs or the enhanced 
whistleblower protections of Dodd–Frank.155 Even if the whistleblower 
reward programs survive, the designation of resources to these programs 
and the amount of payouts will likely decline.156 Many commentators in 
the securities industry have theorized that the SEC is poised to decrease 
corporate sanctions and possibly become more hostile towards 
whistleblowers under the new leadership President Trump appoints.157 
Whistleblower protections, even if repealed under Dodd–Frank would 
still be available through Sarbanes–Oxley and state laws, although less 
robust.158 The scope of covered employees would likely diminish and the 
longer statute of limitations as well as private right to a federal cause of 
action would no longer be available.159 Additionally, depending on who 
President Trump selects for appointment to federal and administrative 
judge positions, we may begin to see a shift towards more stringent 
applications of whistleblower protection laws.160 One thing, however, is 
certain: the realm of financial regulation and corporate governance is set 
to sail into uncharted territories under the Trump administration 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The role of the corporate whistleblower has long been revered yet 
viewed with skepticism in modern American society. Despite attempts at 
affording protections to whistleblowers, safeguards have been an 
acknowledged yet often overlooked issue in American history. Within the 
private sector, the whistleblower plays an imperative role in facilitating 
corporate governance and yet the protections current statutes afford 
whistleblowers are insufficient and seldom achieve compliance or 
encourage good corporate behavior. While regulation like Sarbanes–
Oxley and Dodd–Frank provide redress to whistleblowers, the 
administration of such regulations and the apparatus in place to enforce 
them has been largely ineffective. Additionally, the Digital Realty 
decision may potentially undercut corporations’ internal compliance 
programs. Institutional failures and under resourced agencies make it 
particularly difficult for both whistleblower protections and corporate 
governance to coexist harmoniously—ultimately seeming destined for 
failure. Rather than reforming legislation, agencies such as OSHA must 
look internally to improve the handling of whistleblower claims if there is 
truly any corporate governance to be achieved. The nature of financial 
fraud and corporate malfeasance is inherently dependent on the fast–paced 
dynamic nature of the financial industry, and thus, the institutions in place 
for handling whistleblower complaints should be designed to react as such. 
Until then, as long as we keep putting corporate governance on the 
backburner, the wolves of Wall Street will keep winning and the expense 
of whistleblowers. 
